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Uniform auctions are commonly used to elicit willingness to pay for new or novel products, product attributes, or 
non-market goods. However, most auctions or other contingent-valuation techniques do not allow for negative values, 
despite the fact that many consumers hold negative values for these products or product attributes. We conducted a 
WTP auction for a new product along with a within-sample WTA second auction allowing for negative responses. 
We fi  nd that failing to allow for negative values signifi  cantly infl  ates willingness to pay estimates and estimates of 
expected market share. This paper provides a method of incorporating negative values into auctions and willingness 
to pay elicitation.
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Experimental uniform auctions have become a 
popular method of eliciting consumer willingness 
to pay for neoteric goods (Fox et al. 1994, 1995, 
1998; Fox, Hayes, and Shogren 2002; Evans et 
al. 2008; Lusk et al. 2001; Colson, Rousu, and 
Huffman 2008; Hoffman et al. 1993; Roosen et al. 
1998; Shogren et al. 1984, 1999). The popularity 
of uniform auctions is based on four attractive 
properties. First, uniform auction mechanisms are 
demand revealing and incentive compatible; the 
weakly dominant strategy of the respondent is to 
reveal their true willingness to pay for the prod-
uct in question (Lusk 2003). Second, the market-
clearing price is determined endogenously. Third, 
the rules describing pricing and allocation of the 
product in question are easy to explain. Fourth, 
because uniform auctions are non-hypothetical, 
problems associated with hypothetical bias are 
avoided.
Researchers, however, have recognized that 
some participants in experiments (and, indeed, 
consumers in general) may have negative values 
for the product being evaluated. For example, 
some consumers may perceive “irradiated” meat 
to be safer than “non-irradiated” meat and be 
willing to pay a positive premium to consume 
it. Other consumers may view “irradiated” meat 
in a negative light and demand a payment to 
consume it. Concern about negative values is 
not limited to neoteric goods, but is a concern 
in environmental studies as well, especially 
those using contingent-valuation methods. The 
concern relates to respondents who express zero 
value for an environmental good but actually 
hold a negative value, thus inflating willing-
ness to pay (WTP) estimates and leading to poor 
policy prescriptions (Hanemann 1994; Diamond 
and Hausman 1994; Macmillan, Duff, and Elston 
2001; Clinch and Murphy 2001). As with envi-
ronmental goods, auctions for neoteric goods 
where those with negative values bid zero also 
artificially inflates WTP values and distorts 
derived demand functions. 
Despite the recognition of potential negative 
values, many auction experiments are designed 
presuming people with negative values will bid 
zero (or are indifferent) (see, e.g., Fox, Hayes, 
and Shogren 2002). By contrast, Buhr et al. (1993) 
parsed potential respondents to an auction involv-
ing hormone-treated pork into two groups—one 
preferring hormone-treated meat and one prefer-
ring no growth hormones—and conducted two 
independent auctions. While explicitly accounting 
for potential negative values, the weakness of this 
approach is that it a priori segments respondents 
outside of the auction environment. As such, re-
spondents self-select into different auctions by a 
dichotomous-choice question that is hypothetical 
resulting in potential hypothetical bias. Dickinson 
and Bailey (2002) took a different approach by 
simply allowing respondents to express negative 
values within a single auction. This approach repre-
sents an improvement in that it allows respondents 
“within sample” to express negative values, but, 
as the authors note, the mechanism may allow for 
respondents to “game” the experiment by enticing Journal of Food Distribution Research 40(2) 48   March 2009
respondents to bid negative values in order to extract 
payments from the monitor.1
We follow a process similar to Parkhurst, 
Shogren, and Dickinson (2004) that allows respon-
dents to express negative values in an induced value 
WTP experiment. In contrast to Parkhurst et al., we 
then propose a second step where respondents who 
expressed a zero or negative value participated in a 
willingness to accept (WTA) auction. The purpose 
of this test is to examine a two-step auction that is 
more consistent with the needs of applied auctions 
for neoteric or environmental goods. We fi  nd that 
the two-step auction generally improved demand 
revelation over both a truncated (non-negative value 
only) and negative-value WTP auction. Next, we 
use the two-step procedure in an auction for a neo-
teric product. Respondents expressed a willingness 
to pay for the neoteric good in a traditional auction 
format. Respondents expressing a zero willingness 
to pay effectively revealed themselves as having no 
value or a negative value for the neoteric good; that 
is, they revealed their preference in a non-hypotheti-
cal setting consistent with Dickinson and Bailey 
(2002). These respondents then participated in a 
second willingness to accept auction, thus reveal-
ing their negative value for the neoteric good in a 
manner consistent with Buhr et al. (1993). Results 
show that inclusion of the negative-value results 
signifi  cantly lower willingness to pay for the neo-
teric good, and thus suggest a different estimate of 
market share for the product.
Induced-Value Experiment 
Before using a new procedure, we much fi  rst es-
tablish its validity in accurately eliciting demand 
(or WTP). This test is accomplished by examining 
the “demand revelation” properties. That is, if the 
economic auction is effective, it should induce re-
spondents to reveal their value for a good by bidding 
their maximum WTP for a good. To avoid mixing 
private values with experimental stimuli, we use a 
generic good and provide “values” for that good; 
next we observe bidding behavior.
Undergraduate students were recruited using 
standard procedures and a $5 participation fee. 
Respondents were only told that they would be 
participating in an economic experiment. A total 
of 40 respondents were recruited—20 for each of 
two treatments. Respondents were told that they 
would be participating in a Vickrey uniform 4th price  th price  th
WTP auction (instructions are available from the 
author upon request). Vickery auctions are sealed-
bid auctions, but rather than the “highest bidder” 
winning the auction, the nth-highest bidder (in this 
case, the fourth-highest bidder; a 2nd price auction is  nd price auction is  nd
the most common for small samples) sets the price. 
In a 4th price auction the three highest bidders then 
pay the 4th highest price. The traditional 2nd (or any  nd (or any  nd
number) auction is known to be accurate in the ag-
gregate (Vickery 1961), but this auction form does 
not engage off-margin bidders (that is, people whose 
values are far below the market price). A random 
nth price auction (Shogren et al. 2001) remedies this 
situation but is signifi  cantly more complicated for 
the monitor. Because there was a limited supply of 
the farm-raised product, an nth price auction was not 
possible. However, a 4th price auction was used to 
more actively engage off-margin bidders compared 
with a 2nd price auction because more respondents  nd price auction because more respondents  nd
had the potential to “win” the auction and purchase 
the product.
Each respondent was provided an induced value 
ranging from −$4.20 to $4.20, with 13 of the 20 
induced values being positive and seven being 
negative. Respondents were told they could bid 
any value and were provided with examples of the 
implications of both positive and negative bids with 
both positive and negative induced values. Respon-
dents were then asked to place a bid based on their 
induced value. The optimal strategy is to bid one’s 
induced value.
Bids were collected and ranked from highest 
to lowest, with the fourth-highest price setting the 
market price. Winning bidders were compensated 
and excused. All non-winning bidders with positive 
values were paid for their participation and excused. 
Finally, bidders with a zero or negative bid were 
asked to stay to participate in a second auction.
Those respondents who bid zero or a negative 
value then participated in a second auction, where 
they possessed the same induced value, but were 
participating in a WTA auction. Respondents were 
told that they would be participating in a Vickrey-
1 It should be noted that Dickinson and Bailey did not observe 
large negative bids, suggesting that respondents did not 
strategically “game” the experiment. Furthermore, negative 
bids occurred in less than fi  ve percent of the bids, and the 
absolute magnitude of the negative bids relative to positive 
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style 2nd price auction. These respondents were 
asked to place a bid based on their induced value 
(the optimal strategy in this case is to bid −1*in-
duced value). Bids were collected and ranked from 
lowest to highest, with the second lowest bid setting 
the market price. The winning bidder was compen-
sated and all others were paid their participation fee 
and the auction ended.
Data were analyzed for demand revelation prop-
erties using three perspectives of the data. First, the 
raw data from the WTP auction (including negative 
bids) were examined. Bids were regressed against 
induced values—Bid = α + βIV—with the null hy-
pothesis for demand revelation being α = 0 and β
= 1. That is, if the respondent is perfectly revealing 
their underlying “value” for the good (or, IV), their 
bid should perfectly refl  ect that value. Thus the re-
lationship between bids and induced values should 
form a 45-degree line from the origin.
Second, for observations where the bid was nega-
tive, the actual bid was replaced with a zero (here-
inafter called truncated). The truncated data mimics 
what would be observed in an applied auction where 
negative values were present but expressed as zero 
bids. A second regression identical to that above 
was conducted to examine demand revelation in the 
truncated auction. Finally, for those observations 
where a negative or zero bid was observed in the 
WTP auction, the bids from the second round WTA 
auction were used to replace the original bids.
Table 1 shows the results of the regressions on 
the induced values.2 The fi  rst column shows the re-
sults for the WTP auction with the original data. The 
Wald test statistic (14.81) suggests rejection (at the 
one-percent level) of the null hypothesis of truthful 
demand revelation (that is, a joint test of α = 0 and 
β = 1). Likewise, the results from the truncated auc-
tion regression (second column) suggest rejection of 
truthful demand revelation at the one-percent level. 
However, we fail to reject truthful revelation for the 
two-step auction (third column) at the one-percent 
level, but can reject at the fi  ve-percent level.
We compared the demand revelation properties 
of each different view of the data using an F-test 
(Table 1). In all cases the null hypothesis of equal 
explanatory power is rejected. Most importantly, 
Table 1. Regression Results for Induced-Value Auction.
 Variable  Original data Truncated data 2-Step data
Intercept 0.153 1.064** −0.126
(0.303)a (0.198) (0.306)
Induced value 0.60** 0.252** 0.727**
(0.105) (0.068) (0.105)
Wald test  14.81** 14.95** 6.93*
for α = 1 β = 1
F-tests
Original vs. truncated 13.97**
Original vs. 2-step 7.52**
Truncated vs. 2-step 24.49**
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*Denotes statistical signifi  cance at the 0.05 level.
**Denotes statistical signifi  cance at the 0.01 level.
2 The results are based on a data set where all bids that were more 
than 400 percent of their induced value were eliminated.Journal of Food Distribution Research 40(2) 50   March 2009
the two-step auction exhibited signifi  cantly better 
demand revelation properties than did both the 
truncated and full WTP auctions. Thus it can be 
concluded that the two-step procedure does improve 
demand revelation in the presence of negative val-
ues in this uniform auction.
Given these results, we used a two-step auction 
on a neoteric good to examine the potential effects 
of negative values on predictions of market share 
and consumer surplus in the face of potential nega-
tive values.3 That auction is outlined below. 
Product Background
The product used in this experiment is a pre-cooked 
“farm-raised” roast beef product developed in a 
food-science department at a major university. 
“Farm-raised” in this context refers to the fact that 
the beef used to produce the roast beef was fi  nished 
only on grass and forage, not in commercial feedlots. 
The cuts of meat were marinated, pre-cooked, sliced 
and packaged in translucent eight-ounce packages 
with the normal nutritional information. In addition, 
the label contains the words “farm-raised.” Current-
ly, pre-cooked roast beef products are being offered 
in stores (primarily by Hormel). These products are 
marinated and pre-cooked in a similar manner to 
the farm-raised product. Nutritional information is 
consistent as is package weight. Thus the primary 
difference between products is the manner in which 
the beef is produced.4
Experimental Design 
A uniform 4th price auction was used to elicit respon- th price auction was used to elicit respon- th
dent willingness to pay (WTP) for the farm-raised 
pre-cooked roast beef. A total of 25 respondents 
were recruited from the student body of a major 
university by offering $10 for participation in an 
“economic experiment.” Respondents were initially 
asked to fi  ll out a survey that took approximately 
20 minutes so that they felt that they had “earned” 
their initial endowment. Next, respondents were 
each provided with a Snickers candy bar and told 
they would participate in a 4th price auction to trade 
their Snickers bar for a Butterfi  nger bar.5 Two hy-
pothetical rounds of the auction for the candy bar 
were conducted to “train” respondents in the auc-
tion mechanism and decision rules to determine 
the winner. The candy bar auction was conducted 
as hypothetical so that there would be no altera-
tions to initial endowments (that is, everyone went 
into the beef experiment with the same amount of 
show-up fee remaining) for the beef experiment. 
At the same time, we wished to avoid potential 
demand reduction effects where those winning the 
candy bar auction would not feel “saturated” and 
not actively participate in the beef experiment. Re-
spondents were allowed to ask questions about the 
auction mechanism after participating in the candy 
bar exercise.
Next, respondents were told that they would 
be participating in a non-hypothetical 4th price 
auction for the pre-cooked roast beef. Each re-
spondent was provided with a Hormel pre-cooked 
roast beef product and told that they would be bid-
ding to exchange their pre-cooked product for a 
“farm-raised” product. The farm-raised roast beef 
product was described and samples were passed 
among the respondents so that they could examine 
the product, nutritional information, etc. Respon-
dents were also informed that the Hormel product 
was derived from their normal commercial beef 
supply, which is fi  nished in commercial feedlots. 
The auction mechanism was described again and 
respondents were allowed to seek any additional in-
formation about the mechanism. Respondents were 
told to place a bid that could be any “non-negative 
value.” One round of bidding was conducted. The 
top four bidders and fourth-highest price were then 
identifi  ed and winning bidders paid the monitor and 
exchanged the products.
Those bidders who bid zero (or expressed zero 
WTP) were asked to stay and all other respondents 
were dismissed from the experiment. The remain-
ing respondents were told that they were going to 
participate in a second auction. This auction was a 
3 Use of an environmental good was considered. However, to 
be able to easily deliver a good in a non-hypothetical context, 
a private good was chosen. While the policy implications in the 
context of a private good are not as relevant, it does illustrate the 
effects on consumer surplus when negative values are present. 
While not as important in a policy context, the results from the 
private-good experiment do have implications for predicting 
market share.
4 There may be some “brand” affi  liation by respondents, leading 
to potential status quo bias. However, this would exist in the 
market as well, so results should be consistent with what would 
be observed in an actual market setting.
5 Instructions for this and the beef experiment are available 
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willingness to accept auction; that is, respondents 
were bidding a positive amount of money they 
would require to be paid to trade their product for 
the farm raised product.6 In this case, however, the 
auction was a 2nd price auction—the lowest bidder  nd price auction—the lowest bidder  nd
would receive the second-lowest bid price for the 
exchange.7 The results of the second auction are 
used to represent the negative values that these 
individual actually hold for the product.8
Results
Descriptive statistics of sample characteristics are 
shown in Table 2. About 76 percent of the sample 
had previously purchased a pre-cooked roast beef 
product. Price and visual appearance were the two 
most important attributes cited by the respondents in 
their beef-purchase decisions, while label information 
and special characteristics were least important. There 
was diversity in the sample between males (56 percent) 
and females (44 percent); however, the sample was 
composed primarily of Caucasians (88 percent).
Auction results are shown in Table 3. The 
“Truncated” column shows the descending rank-
order results of the 4th price auction. As can be seen, 
the average WTP for the “farm-raised” roast beef 
is $0.42 above the price of the existing product. 
However, 32 percent of the sample expressed a $0 
WTP in this auction, suggesting that a large portion 
of the sample potentially held negative values for 
the product.9
6 Parkhurst, Shogren, and Dickinson (2004) observed bias bids 
when incorporating negative values in the 2nd price auction. We  nd price auction. We  nd
frame all bids as positive values to avoid this bias.
7 Ordinarily, we would prefer to use the same auction 
mechanism as in the fi  rst experiment. However, because a 
smaller number of people bid zero in the fi  rst auction, a 4th
price auction was not possible.
8 We are assuming that there is no WTP/WTA disparity. 
Because the divergence between WTP and WTA is related to 
the ambiguity or riskiness of the product, we do not expect 
this divergence to be large. As the results show, there is at 
least one individual who was indifferent (bid zero in both 
auctions), suggesting that the WTP/WTA divergence is 
probably not large.





Have you purchased pre-cooked roast beef before? 0.76 0.436
Factors important in beef purchase decisions (1 = very 
important; 5 = not important)
Price 1.92 0.909
Visual appearance 1.80 1.224
Convenience 2.76 1.012
Label information 3.36 1.150
Origin 2.88 1.236
Special characteristics  (e.g., no hormones, etc.) 3.88 1.236
Servings of beef per week 4.32 2.926
Gender  (1 = male; 0 = female) 0.56 0.506
Age 24.32 4.670
9 This fi  nding is supported by the relative unimportance of either 
origin or special characteristics in beef-purchase decisions 
expressed by the respondents in Table 2.Journal of Food Distribution Research 40(2) 52   March 2009
Those expressing $0 WTP participated in a WTA 
auction where respondents were asked to bid the 
lowest amount of money it would take to get them 
to consume the product (WTA in Table 2). As can be 
seen, these bids ranged from $0 to $5. These were 
then inserted in place of the $0 bid as a negative 
value. If the negative values signifi  cantly infl  u-
ence the WTP for the product, the average WTP 
when negative values were included should be less 
than the average WTP in the truncated auction. A 
Kolmogrov goodness-of-fi  t test is used to test the 
hypothesis that the distribution from the Negative 
value and truncated samples are identical. We reject 
the hypothesis at the fi  ve-percent signifi  cance level. 
The distributions underlying the two samples are 
signifi  cantly different. Therefore a t-test for compar-
Table 3. Results for Truncated and Willingness to Accept Auctions and Combined Negative Values.
Bidder Truncated Bidder Negative value
19 $2.00 19 $2.00
16 $1.50 16 $1.50
1 $1.00 1 $1.00
6 $1.00 6 $1.00
7 $1.00 7 $1.00 WTA
25 $0.75 25 $0.75 Bidder WTA
4 $0.50 4 $0.50 18 $0.00
11 $0.50 11 $0.50 14 $0.25
15 $0.50 15 $0.50 10 $0.75
21 $0.50 21 $0.50 2 $2.00
3 $0.25 3 $0.25 13 $2.00
12 $0.25 12 $0.25 5 $2.50
23 $0.25 23 $0.25 8 $5.00
20 $0.20 20 $0.20 17 $5.00
22 $0.10 22 $0.10
24 $0.10 24 $0.10
9 $0.05 9 $0.05
2 $0.00 18 $0.00
5 $0.00 14 −$0.25
8 $0.00 10 −$0.75
10 $0.00 2 −$2.00
13 $0.00 13 −$2.00
14 $0.00 5 −$2.50
17 $0.00 8 −$5.00
18 $0.00 17 −$5.00
Mean $0.42 −$0.28
STD $0.53 $1.76A Two-Step Auction in the Presence of Negative Values   53 Nalley and Hudson
ing means from dependent samples was calculated. 
The t-statistic for this comparison (assuming un-
equal variances) is 2.12, suggesting that the mean 
WTP in the negative-value auction is signifi  cantly 
less than the truncated WTP at the 0.03 level of 
signifi  cance. Thus we conclude that inclusion of the 
negative values signifi  cantly reduces mean WTP for 
the farm-raised pre-cooked roast beef.
This result has obvious implications for predic-
tions of market share. Market share at any price is 
calculated as the percentage of respondents who have 
WTP equal to or greater than that price. Market-share 
functions for both the truncated (WTP) and nega-
tive-value auctions (WTPN) are shown in Figure 1. 
At any price equal to or less than $0, the truncated 
auction predicts that everyone is indifferent, and 
therefore likely to consume the product. However, 
we see that inclusion of negative values predicts a 
lower percentage of people consuming the product 
at all prices greater than −$5. For example, if we 
assume that the farm-raised product is priced at the 
same level as the existing product (price of $0 in the 
fi  gure), the truncated auction predicts 100 percent of 
the people would consume it. However, inclusion 
of the negative values suggests that only 72 percent 
of the respondents would consume the farm-raised 
product, meaning that the WTP auction alone results 
in an overestimation of market share.
To further illustrate the potential policy implica-
tions of failure to include negative values, we esti-
mated demand functions for the new product: one 
for the truncated auction and one with the inclusion 
of negative values. Bids were rank-ordered from 
highest to lowest. A demand of one unit was entered 
for the highest bid, with one additional unit added to 
the next lowest bid, and so on, until a total demand 
of 25 units was reached for the lowest bid. The bids 
were then regressed against quantities, resulting in 
a demand function of q = f( f( f p (p ( ). Consumer surplus 
was then calculated as
Price
Figure 1. Market Share Predictions for Farm Raised Pre-Cooked Roast Beef Using Truncated (WTP) 
and Negative-Value Auctions (WTPN).Journal of Food Distribution Research 40(2) 54   March 2009










The consumer surplus is estimated over the range 
of p = −$5 to $0 because −$5 is the lowest price 
observed and we wish to compare consumer surplus 
up to the point where prices of the two products is 
the same.
Because the demand function is censored at 1 and 
25, a double-limit Tobit model was used for estima-
tion. The results Tobit model are shown in Table 4. 
As expected, the quantity demanded is inversely 
related to the WTP value (price). The Tobit model 
indicates that consumer surplus with the truncated 
auction is $367, compared with $137 for the nega-
tive-value auction. Thus failure to include negative 
values in this case would result in an overestimation 
of consumer surplus by two times. 
Conclusion
This analysis used a two-step procedure to incorpo-
rate negative values into the elicitation of willing-
ness to pay for a neoteric good. Previous studies 
have segmented respondents into groups either 
preferring or not preferring the neoteric good on the 
basis of a hypothetical dichotomous question (Buhr 
et al. 1993). Because the question is hypothetical, 
there is no assurance that the individuals answered 
truthfully. Other studies have allowed for negative 
values directly in an auction, but not the potential 
for strategic behavior on the part of the respon-
dents (Dickinson and Bailey 2002). We combine 
these methods by using an auction mechanism that 
allows individuals to reveal either indifference or 
potential negative values by expressing a zero WTP. 
Those expressing a zero WTP were then engaged 
in a WTA auction. The results of the WTA auction 
were included as negative values for the respondents 
providing a zero WTP in the fi  rst auction.
The results are consistent with expectation in 
that inclusion of the negative values signifi  cantly 
reduces the average WTP from the auction. In ad-
dition, use of the negative values results in a dif-
ferent prediction of product acceptance or market 
share. Ultimately, failure to account for negative 
values can result in an overestimation of the po-
tential demand for the product. One could argue 
that those who express a negative value would not 
purchase the product anyway. This presumption is 
likely correct, but these results suggest that a simple 
expression of zero WTP does not necessarily imply 
indifference. Thus lumping together those with true 
indifference (or a true zero WTP) with those with 
a negative value results in an impression that more 
people will purchase the product at no price dif-
ference than is actually the case. The confounding 
of these two different groups, therefore, leads to 
incorrect pricing decisions.









Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Statistically signifi  cant at the 1-percent signifi  cance level.A Two-Step Auction in the Presence of Negative Values   55 Nalley and Hudson
More broadly, however, the results of this study 
and previous studies highlight the importance of 
negative values in policy analysis. In our example, it 
is obvious that the consumer-surplus estimate using 
the truncated auction results in a larger consumer 
surplus than when using the negative-value auction. 
Because individuals may have a negative value for 
a product or policy, implementation of that policy, 
without accounting for the opposition towards the 
policy, would result in less-than-expected welfare 
gains. Therefore it is critical methods that incorpo-
rate negative values are used in research that elicits 
WTP estimates. 
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